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IN THE UTAH COORT OF APPEALS 
RALPH PECKHAM, : 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , : Case No. 870403-CA 
v. : 
GERALD COOK, Warden, Utah : Category No. 3 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal seeks review of an order of the Third 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court for S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah, 
g r an t i ng the respondent Warden Gerald L. Cook's c r o s s motion for 
summary judgment and d i smiss ing the a p p e l l a n t Ralph Peckham's 
p e t i t i o n for a wr i t of habeas c o r p u s . (He rea f t e r , the a p p e l l a n t 
s h a l l be r e f e r r e d to as Mthe p r i s o n e r " and the respondent s h a l l 
be r e f e r r e d to as "Warden Cook".) 
This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n to hear t h i s appeal 
pur suan t to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-2( f ) (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The i s s u e s presented on t h i s appeal a re as fo l lows : 
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(i) Whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) 
applies retrospectively or prospectively to the prisoner; 
(ii) Whether the prisoner's complaint is barred by a 
statute of limitation; and 
(iii) Whether the prisoner's factual allegations raised 
for the first time on appeal can be considered by this court. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions cited in this brief are set 
forth below: 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (Supp. 1987): 
No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactivef unless expressly so declared. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
months probation in felony or Class B 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in Class B. 
misdemeanor cases, the probation shall be 
terminated, unless earlier terminated by the 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (Supp. 1987): 
Within Three Months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been known be 
petitioner or counsel for petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about June 3, 1987, almost two years after he 
began serving his prison sentence, the prisoner filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(7)(a) applies retrospectively to the date of his initial 
probation. The prisoner subsequently filed a motion for summary 
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judgment. Warden Cook filed a cross motion for summary judgment 
and argued that § 77-18-M 7) (a) does not apply retrospectively 
and argued that the prisoner's action was barred by the 
applicable statute of limitation. The Honorable Frank G. Noel, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, granted Warden Cook's cross motion for summary judgment 
and entered an order dismissing the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about July 21, 1983, the prisoner pled guilty to 
forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony. (R. 3) On 
September 15, 1983, the prisoner pled guilty to forcible sexual 
abuse and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. The prisoner 
was then placed on probation and the prison term was stayed. (R. 
3). On March 29, 1985, § 77-18-1(7)(a) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 
1987) became effective. Prior to the effective date of that 
statute, the prisoner had not violated the terms of his 
probation. (R. 3) In July 1985, the prisoner violated the terms 
of his probation and was committed to the Utah State Prison as a 
result of that violation. (R. 3) On or about June 3, 1987, the 
prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is 
the subject of this appeal. (R. 3) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Recognized rules of statutory construction require that 
unless the legislature declares to the contrary, statutes only 
apply prospectively. Thus when the Utah Legislature enacted § 
77-18-1(7)(a) after the prisoner had been placed on probation, 
that statute does not apply to him. 
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Additionally, long-standing rules have upheld that 
statutes of limitation can bar an action after a lapse of time. 
Utah's statute of limitation on the writ of habeas corpus 
provided a reasonable time and opportunities for the prisoner to 
bring an action. Therefore, the prisoner's delay of almost two 
years effectively barred his complaint. 
Finally, it is well established that factual issues not 
raised to the trial court cannot be considered by appellate 
courts. The prisoner's new factual allegations raised in this 
appeal must likewise be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
POIHT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-18-1 (7) (a) ONLY APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY 
The prisoner argues that pursuant to Utah Code § 77-18-
1(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) his probation should have expired following 
18 months of successful compliance with the terms of his 
probation. But because the enactment and effective date of § 77-
18-1(7)(a) was after the prisoner had been placed on probation, 
this statute does not apply retrospectively to him. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the long-
standing principle that unless expressly directed by the 
legislature, statutes cannot apply retrospectively. In Carlucci 
v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah 
1986), the court said, "The general rule is that the law 
establishing substantive rights and liabilities when a cause of 
action arises, and not a subsequently enacted statute, governs 
the resolution of the dispute." 
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The Utah Legislature has specifically statedr unless 
declared otherwise, statutes must be applied prospectively. That 
declaration is found in Utah Code Ann. S 68-3-3 (Supp. 1987), 
which reads: 
No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless eypressly so declared, 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Code does not expressly declare an exception 
to the prospective effect of § 77-18-K 7) (a) . Therefore, in 
accordance with the general rule and in compliance with the 
legislative intent dictated by § 68-3-3, the operation of § 77-
16-1(7)(a) can only apply prospectively. Accordingly, the 
prisoner's probation was properly revoked and he was rightfully 
imprisoned upon the violation of that probation. 
POINT II 
THE PRISONER'S PETITION IS BARRED BY A STAIPTE OF LIMITATION 
The Utah Code contains a specific statute limiting the 
length of time in which an action that can be remedied by a writ 
of habeas corpus must be filed. That statute reads: 
Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been known by 
petitioner or counsel for petitioner. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-31.1 (1987) (emphasis added). 
The prisoner's probation was revoked in July 1985. (P. 
3) In order to comply with the statute of limitation, he should 
have tiled his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the end ot 
September 1985. The appellant failed to file until June 1987. 
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He missed the statutory deadline by approximately 20 months; 
consequently, the lower court ruled that the prisoner is barred 
from seeking relief by a writ of habeas corpus. 
The prisoner argues that the application of the 
statutes of limitation is unconstitutional because it violates 
both the due process clause and the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution. He also claims that this statute 
violates the Utah Constitution by denying the prisoner access to 
the courts and his right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The establishment of statutes of limitations, however, 
has been recognized by the United State Supreme Court. In the 
long standing case of Terry v. Anderson. 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 
(1877) it was said by Justice Waite: 
This Court has often decided that the 
statutes of limitations affecting existing 
rights are not unconstitutional, if a 
reasonable time is given for the commencement 
of an action before the bar takes effect. 
Admittingly, three months is a short period of time, 
but in the context of writs of habeas corpus the time specified 
by the legislators is reasonable because of the following: The 
underlying remedy sought by a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus is foremost on an inmates mind. The profound act of being 
incarcerated is of such a substantial nature that it cannot go 
unnoticed. Further, prisoners are protected by the 
constitutional right ot having access to attorneys and to law 
libraries. £^a, pounds v. Smith. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The time 
specified by the legislature sufficiently provided the prisoner 
with the opportunity to contact an attorney or complete the 
minimum research needed to realize he may ot had a claim. 
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In addition, the enforcement of the statute is similar 
to enforcing the short time limit in which a litigant must file a 
notice of appeal. The penalty for failure to file is harsh, but 
the time limit enforces finality to an action. Concluding that 
the statute of limitation tor petitions for writ of habeas corpus 
is unconstitutional would have a similar effect on the finality 
because it would allow a collateral attack of the underlying case 
over an unlimited period of time. 
The prisoner's assertions that the enforcement of the 
statute denies him the right to petition and the right of access 
to the court are without merit. He still has those rights, but 
like any litigant, he must assert these within the statutory 
period. 
POINT III 
THE PRISONER IS BARRED FROM RAISING FACTDAL ISSDES BEFORE THIS 
COURT 
The prisoner attempts to raise in his appeal an issue 
of fact that was not raised at the trial court. On page 16 of 
his brief, the prisoner says that there remains an issue as to 
whether the prisoner knew or should have known within the time 
prescribed by the statute of limitations that he may have had 
grounds for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The prisoner may not raise such an issue on appeal. He 
was required under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to raise that issue before the trial court. Rule 56(e) 
says: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this Rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
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allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this Rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
(Emphasis added) 
The prisoner chose not to respond to Warden Cook's 
cross motion for summary judgment, and accordingly he failed to 
"set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." Id. 
!n Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American 
Title Insurance Company, 2 4 Ut. Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Jan. 31, 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court refused to consider a factual issue 
the appellant in that case failed to present to the trial court. 
In rejecting the appellant's factual allegations, the Utah 
Supreme Court explained, "This claim has been raised on appeal 
for the first time. . . . [W]e do not consider issues that were 
not presented to the trial court." M » at 13. The Court then 
said, M[W]e conclude that the agency issue is not presented to us 
as a question of law, but as a question of fact which may not be 
determined on appeal." Jji. at 14. Likewise, this court should 
not consider the prisoner's factual claim that was never raised 
at the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Warden Cook respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the trial court's order granting 
the his cross motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this /lJ*r dav of Apjril 1988. 
•o/Z^ 
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